INTRODUCTION
In Japan, performance-based codes have been introduced by the amendment of the Building Standard Law in 2000 with the intention to provide more flexibility and clarity in building regulatory system. In conjunction of the amendment, verification methods for evacuation safety and fire resistance performance are introduced and increasingly used in fire safety designs of actual buildings [1] . Like performance-based fire safety designs in many other countries, the verification methods have defined, explicitly or implicitly, design fires and safety criteria by which compliance with the fire safety requirements are verified. However, the verification methods have not incorporated fire risk concept and this has caused silly fire safety design practices in many aspects.
For example, safety of a staircase, which is vitally important for a large number of occupants, is treated at the same level of attention as safety of a small room with several occupants. Designers and fire engineers are spending most of time for verification of room evacuation safety but very little for much more important floor or whole building evacuation. As a result it seems that they are losing the sense of what is very important and what is less important in fire safety design.
It can be said that fire risk concept has been prudently incorporated in the existing prescriptive fire safety codes, even though implicitly. Looking into any fire safety code, it is easily recognized that small facilities with a small number of occupants are imposed only light requirement or no particular requirement at all while requirements for large scale or high-rise buildings are very rigorous. It is quite natural that the greater the potential consequence of an event the securer measures are taken to minimize the probability of the event to occur.
Development of P-B fire safety design method by introduction of 'design fires and safety criteria' is a remarkable achievement by the effort of fire research community that can greatly contribute to our society. But it is vital for sound fire safety design practices of buildings to incorporate fire risk concept into the P-B fire safety design method. 
E VA C U A T I O N S A F E T Y D E S I G N A N D S A F E T Y VERIFICATION
Adequate design fire scenarios for P-B fire safety design can be different depending on fire safety objectives, i.e. evacuation safety, fire resistance of structure and fire fighters'
safety etc. so they should be developed with due consideration of characteristics of each objective.
In this paper, we focus on the risk-based evacuation safety design of building in fire. Table 1 are classified by the evacuation phase as well.
The interests of building designers and engineers are almost focused on how less expensively and quickly as well as safe effectively these measures can be designed always in mind the compromise with the owner's needs to make most of the building design. Needless to say, it can be a choice, and probably a good choice for them and their clients, not to provide any of such measures at all as long as their designs can clear the safety verification. It will be readily understood that the more rigorous the design fire conditions the higher the fire safety level will be. But higher level of safety can seldom be attained for nothing but usually accompany more cost. So a certain compromise need be sought between safety level and cost. Essential role of the design fire and safety criteria in the P-B safety design method is to control fire risk of buildings within an acceptable level.
Figure 1 Procedure of Fire Safety Verification

EVENT TREE OF DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS
Event-tree is a useful tool to analyze the events involved in the progress of a fire and to find out appropriate design fire scenarios for fire safety assessment. An event tree of fire scenarios associated with evacuation from the room of origin is shown in Figure 2 as an example of event trees for evacuation in fire. According to Figure 2 , the fire scenarios to be considered are as many as 21 cases in all. Although this fire scenario event-tree might seem complicated, since installation of sprinkler system or smoke exhaust system is up to building designers the fire scenarios for a specific building can become simpler depending on the conception of such fire safety measures.
Figure 2 Event tree of fire scenarios in the evacuation from the room of origin
The objective of developing an event tree such as in Figure 2 is to clarify the meaning of evacuation safety design in controlling fire risk under an acceptable level. With the objective in mind, the definitions and qualitative analyses were made as follows:
(1) Outbreak of fire: Fire incidence rate differs with building use and size so affects fire risk of a building. However, it should be noted that fire incidence rate cannot be changed by evacuation safety design.
(2) Fire extinguishments at early stage: Statistically, a significant portion of fires are put out at early stage by building occupants, fire brigade etc. However, it is too difficult to clarify if an evacuation safety design can affect on the early stage fire extinguishments. Perhaps, the effects would be trivial if any.
(3) Growing fire: Although fire incidence rate and fire extinguishments according to building use and size need be taken into account in fire risk analyses, fire safety designs are carried out on the premise that fires grow. The growing fires are classified into "localized fire" and "developed room fire", which are defined here as follow:
Localized fire: Fire that occurs in a space with limited fire load density, such as in a lobby, a hall etc. The heat release rate of a localized fire is assumed to grow proportionally to time-square in the beginning and then levels off after having reached combustion peak.
Developed room fire:
Fire that occurs in a space with significant fire load density, such as in an office room, a bed room etc. The heat release rate of developed room fire is assumed to grow proportionally to time-square in the beginning and then levels off after the fire has grown to be a fully developed room fire due to the effect of ventilation factor.
(4) Fire control by Sprinkler system: Sprinkler system is supposed to operate when the temperature of a sprinkler head has reached its actuation temperature. The maximum heat release rate of fire that does not actuate sprinkler head, Q sp , can be estimated using established formulas [2] . Unless heat release rate of fire exceeds Q sp sprinkler system will not operate. Then, the heat release rates of fire sources are classified into the following categories, which are illustrated in 
Success:
Sprinkler system that is actuated due to "effective" heat release rate succeeds to extinguish fire or control the heat release rates under Q sp .
Failure:
Sprinkler system fails to control the heat release rate and allows it to increase beyond Q sp by malfunction or insufficient performance. evacuation. However, the degree of the hazard mitigation depends on fire size and capability of smoke exhaust system, which is then up to its design. It is not appropriate to classify smoke control scenarios by the same manner as sprinkler system. Then, the conditions of a smoke exhaust system are simply classified into "actuation" and "non-actuation":
Actuation: Smoke exhaust system operates normally.
Non-actuation:
Smoke exhaust system does not operate due to some fault of system.
(6) Number of evacuation failures C: It is common practice that evacuation safety performance in fire is assessed by means of comparing required safe egress time (RSET) with available safe egress time (ASET), i.e. the time when fire-induced conditions within an occupied space become untenable [3] . Number of evacuation failures, C, is the number of occupants who are exposed to untenable smoke or heat in the evacuation from fire.
(7) Probability of each fire scenario P: The probability of each fire scenario to occur, P i , is calculated from relevant branch probabilities, which involve the reliabilities of sprinkler system, smoke exhaust system and means of escape. Their reliabilities are sometimes high and sometimes low and never perfect. However, these measures are also the objects of fire safety designs so their reliabilities can be raised by appropriate design to a certain degree. It may be possible to exploit fire risk and event-tree analyses to clarify the goal values of the reliabilities of such safety measures to control fire risk below the acceptable level.
RISK-BASED EVALUATION OF EVACUATION SAFET Y PERFORMENCE
According to the event tree as shown in Figure 2 , safety level of an evacuation safety plan is assessed by the risk of evacuation failure, R, given by (1) where P i is the probability of event i and C i is the consequence of event i, or more concretely the number of occupants who fail to evacuate safely.
Although fire incidence rate etc. are involved in fire safety in general, usual fire safety design is made on the premise that a fire breaks out and grows. Hence the summation Σ in Equation 1 is taken with respect of the events under growing fire only. Since the all the events under the premise are supposed to be covered by the event tree
In order for an evacuation safety plan to be acceptable, the risk R must be below
If the worst scenario of all the scenario can be identified and the number of occupants who fail to safely escape in it, C max , can be found, Equation 1 turns out to be as follows (4) In other words, if C max < R A , no other scenarios need to be checked. Furthermore, if the initial number of occupants, Q 0 , is smaller than R A ,
Therefore, Equation 1 is always satisfied so that evacuation safety plan itself is not necessary.
ACCEPTABLE RISK FOR EVACUATION IN FIRE
In order to implement the fire safety design method using the event tree in Figure 2 , the concrete numbers of the acceptable risk, R A , involved in the event tree need to be specified. As mentioned earlier, acceptable fire risk is a societal compromise between fire safety and fire costs. However, there is nowhere we can find explicit statement of the acceptable risk level so we cannot help but to seek for it in indirect sources. The candidate sources will be the existing fire safety provisions and the public attitude to the current fire loss.
Definition of evacuation failure
When we discuss the risk for evacuation in fire in the context of evacuation safety designs of buildings, it is necessary to define what the failure of evacuation is. The casualty level in Table 2 ranges from slight to death. A question here is which level of injury should be deemed as the evacuation failure? This is related to the safety criteria used in fire safety verification methods. In Japan, the criteria are such that smoke layer interface is 1.8m or higher or that '(temperature rise) 2 -time' exposure is less than 10 4 K 2 s etc. [5] Therefore, the violation of such criteria dose not immediately mean the death of an occupant but rather correspond to slight injury or interruption of smooth escape due to exposure to smoke. 
Acceptable evacuation risk in the context of evacuation safety design verification
If the current level of the fire casualties for buildings of mixed use is a societal acceptance without causing particularly serious concern, it follows from the above definition of evacuation failure that the acceptable risk in the context of evacuation safety verification is the total casualty rate, i.e. 0.55 person/(major fire) as long as this type of use is concerned.
Dwellings, whether independent houses or family units of apartment buildings, provides basis for acceptable evacuation risk since almost no provisions is imposed for evacuation safety. Although about 1,300 persons are killed every year by fires in dwellings in Japan [6] , the probability of a specific person to be killed by a fire is counted to be only once per 100,000 years, i.e. 1,000 times 100 years of lives! Looking into fire statistics, number of casualties by dwelling fires is about 5 times of the number of deaths [6] , so the total casualties including deaths are about 1,300 x 6=7,800. On the other hand, the failure rate of early stage extinguishments of 19,000
dwelling fires per year appears to be 40 -55% [7] , i. e. the number of major fires is estimated to be 19,000x(0.45-0.6)=8,550-10,400. So roughly, the casualty rate may be converted to 0.8 person/(major fire), although a certain portion of casualties might have been caused by minor fires as well.
It is not easy to obtain such concrete value of risk for variety types of building uses, except the mixed use buildings, in Tokyo only, and dwellings because of unavailability of relevant data. 
SCREENING FOR SELECTION OF SAFET Y DESIGN TARGETS
Not all the buildings but only particularly important ones are objects of usual P-B fire safety designs/verifications. As already stated above, a dwelling building is out of interests of P-B fire safety designs although its death rate per fire is extremely high relative to building of other types of use. In terms of consistency of fire risk, buildings or spaces of buildings under certain size could be omitted from the objects of P-B fire safety designs.
In the framework of P-B evacuation safety design/verification, the evacuation failure risk, R evac , can be expressed as
where P mf is the incidence rate of major fire per area, A spc is the area of space to be potentially involved in fire, P inj is the probability to be injured by a major fire and C 0 is the number of occupants potentially involved in the major fire. Note here that fire incidence rate is assumed to depend not only on type of use but also on size of building.
If taking dwelling houses, H, as the standard, the risk of different type of building, K, must be
that is
From the above discussion, for dwelling houses as the standard person/(major fire) (9) in real fires.
The average number of family member in Japan is 2.4 persons from the census [9] so on statistic base C 0 (H)=2.4 person so that P inj (H) would be 0.8/2.4=1/3 (person/major fire)/person if family members were always fully loaded in the event of a major fire. In reality, major fires do not always occur when all the family member happen to be in their house. For example, in the extreme case of arson fires, which comprise about 30% of fires in recent years, nobody might happen to be in the house. There is no statistics data available for such information but of course the range of the value is 0 -2.4 so simply mean value, 1.2, is employed here. Then it follows that P inj (H)=0.8/1.2=2/3 (person/major fire)/person.
In P-B fire safety designs, in addition to the premise of major fire, number of occupants is normally set by area assuming fully loaded condition. The number will be conservatively set at 5-6 persons for a house with average area. Here we arbitrarily adopt C 0 (H)=6 person. 
SELECTION OF DESIGN FIRES IN EVACUATION SAFETY DESIGNS
Acceptable evacuation risk in evacuation safety verification
Once it has been decided after screening that an evacuation safety design is required for a space, it must be verified that the evacuation failure risk is lower than the acceptable risk. The risk is the conditional risk under the premise that a major fire has occurred and grows, i.e. the risk in the context of evacuation safety verification of a space
K). According to Equation 8 and
11, this must satisfy
The right hand side of the last row is the concrete value of the acceptable evacuation failure risk. Incidentally, the ratio P mf (H)/ P mf (K) is given from 
Fire growth coefficient
Looking back to design fire types in Figure 3 , a design fire consists of t-square part at initial growth and level off part. The level off part is controlled by ventilation factor of fire room, in case of developed room fire, by fire source size, in case of localized fire and by the effect of sprinkler installation in the both cases. The early stage of fire growth is expressed in terms of heat release rate, Q f , as
where t is the time from ignition and α is the growth coefficient.
Since evacuation is human reaction to fire at relatively early stage, result of safety verification is very dependent on the value of α. The value of α is considered to vary depending on type and amount of fuels so is probabilistic in general, with high probability for small values and low probability for large value. In realistic fire situations, the probability density function of α, F(α), may be the type of Poisson distribution as shown by dashed line in Figure 4 , but we decided to adopt an exponential distribution for convenience of calculation as
where parameter λ is given using the mean value as
The mean value of fire growth coefficient is considered to depend on use of space since the types and characteristics of live combustible items stored in a space are strongly affected by the use of the space. It may be said that the mean value of fire growth coefficient is one of the most important and objective parameters to characterize building spaces in terms of fire hazards. It is obvious that safety of evacuation in a space depends on the value of fire growth rate, which is governed by coefficient α . While safety of evacuation is easily assured for small fire growth rate, it becomes harder with the increase of the rate. 
Evacuation failure risk and fire growth rate in case with single scenario
The case where a growing fire breaks out in a space with no sprinkler nor smoke control system but ample fire load, i.e. no possibility of localized fire, is one of the basic conditions for evacuation. This corresponds to Scenario 13 in the event tree in Figure 2 .
In this case, the probability of the event in the context of evacuation safety design is unity, i.e. P 13 =1, but fire growth rate is still probabilistic. Hence, the evacuation failure risk R is calculated as follows:
Noting that C(α)=0 for α<α c , the right hand side of Equation 16 can be written as
The concrete function C(α) for α>α c is dependent upon many factors such as room dimensions so not readily known but since
and, from the assumed probability density distribution of Equation 16,
the evacuation failure risk R is 
Evacuation failure risk and fire growth rate in case with two scenarios
As another simple example, the case with smoke control system is considered.
The other conditions are assumed as the same as the above. This case correspond to Scenarios 14 and 15 in the event tree in Figure 2 . Scenario 14 is when the smoke control system is activated and Scenario 15 is when it is not because of some trouble. Figure 6 shows the conceptual relationship between fire growth coefficient, α, and evacuation failure, C(α), for these scenarios. Evacuation safety in Scenario 14 can be assured for wider range of α, than in Scenario 15 since the smoke control system mitigates smoke hazard.
Figure 6 α and C(α) for case with two scenarios
The goal in the case is to satisfy
Hence, it follows that some flexibility exists to attain this goal. We may be able to set partial acceptable risks for each of the scenarios, R A(14) and R A(14) , arbitrarily as
provided that
The design fire for each of the two scenarios can be calculated as 
Evacuation failure risk and fire growth rate in case with multiple scenarios
For the cases with multiple scenarios also, the partial acceptable risk can be arbitrarily chosen to satisfy the following conditions.
and the design fire for each scenarios can be determined using the fire growth coefficient
given by the equation as follows: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, design fire scenarios and acceptable risk, R A , for performance-based evacuation safety design were developed. An event tree of fire scenarios for evacuation safety design from fire room is developed.
Acceptable evacuation failure risk in the context of evacuation safety verification was discussed and sought from the fire statistics available. Using the results, the method for screening building spaces without need of P-B evacuation safety verification was proposed.
For spaces for which evacuation safety verification is required, a methodology to determine the fire growth coefficient of design fire was developed. If evacuation failure is made zero under this design fire, acceptable level of safety can be conservatively assured. However, further consideration is necessary for cases with multiple scenarios.
The concrete value of acceptable risk in the context of evacuation and the screening criteria for various types of occupancy may change if better fire statistic data are found to be available. The data for reliabilities of fire safety measures such as smoke control system, sprinkler system etc. are also necessary but on the other hand such measures are also objects of fire safety design so the reliabilities may depend on the designs. That is, if a smoke control system can cope with severer fire condition, verification for the case the system fails to activate can be made under less severe fire condition.
EXAMPLES
Examples 5:
Let's consider the case that a sprinkler system is installed in addition to a smoke control system with other conditions the same as in Example 4. The corresponding scenarios for this case are 17, 18, 20 and 21 in the event tree in Figure 2 . If it is assumed that success and failure probabilities of the sprinkler system be 0.8 and 0.2, respectively, and that activation and non-activation probabilities of the smoke control system be 0.9 and 0.1. (Note that the activation probability does not immediately means success probability but still depends on its capability). With these assumptions, the corresponding event probabilities are calculated as follows:
Taking into account of that maximum fire size is controlled by the effect of sprinkler in Scenarios 17 and 18, we may arbitrarily set the acceptable risk for each event within the limit of ΣR A(i) <0.92, for example Note that R A(17) =R A(18) =0 means that fire growth coefficients for Scenario 17 and 18 are infinity so the verification must be made with the maximum heat release rate, which will not often cause difficulty, however, because the maximum heat release rate is suppressed by sprinkler effect. In Scenario 20 and 21, some effect to suppress fire may be expected despite of the failure of suppression but it is conservative to neglect the effect, then the design fires are calculated as that is, the fire growth coefficient is 0.072 with smoke control and 0.023 without smoke control. The lower values of α D relative to the values in Example 4 are said to be due to the effect of sprinkler system.
